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Abstract 
Energy sources supply chain is a new research concern in supply chain management. Supply chain coordination 
leads to increased information flow, reduced uncertainty, which has become a critical success factor for energy 
sources supply chain management. We study the energy sources supply chain consisting of one energy sources ven-
dor (SV) and one energy sources integration provider (SIP). We develop information sharing coordination of energy 
sources supply chain between the SV and the SIP. We try to explore the information sharing coordination in energy 
sources supply chain which is classified into different information flows. The findings reinforce the importance of 
information sharing coordination and performance to companies. As a last note, future research direction is pointed 
out.
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Harbin University 
of Science and Technology 
Keywords: energy sources supply chain; energy sources vendor; energy sources integration provider; information sharing; 
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1. Introduction 
Energy sources are significant, and spend is large and growing. Attention to the energy sources supply 
chain by practitioners is necessary for improvement and minimization of value leakage. Similarly, more 
attention to the energy sources supply chain is needed by academics as they educate future practitioners 
and conduct research. Disseminating information on best practices and trends in managing the energy 
sources supply chain and energy sources purchases could help businesses retain their competitive advan-
tage in the growing global economy (Ellram et al., 2004). Improved management of energy sources 
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spending could represent the next major area of cost reduction and value enhancement for organizations. 
When supply chain members are separate and independent economic entities, this action plan has to in-
clude an incentive scheme to allocate the benefits from coordination among them so as to entice their 
cooperation (Li & Wang, 2007). Information coordination is a key approach to achieve supply chain co-
ordination.  
Recently, academic researchers have showed a growing interest in the value of information sharing in 
supply chain. The marketing literature on supply chain coordination focuses on pricing decision without 
inventory replenishment considerations, e.g. Abel P. Jeuland and Steven M. Shugan addressed the prob-
lem of coordinating channel decisions, which showed that quantity discounts are profitable even with no 
order or inventory costs (Jeuland & Shugan, 2008). Charles A. Ingene Mark E. Parr explored wholesale 
pricing behavior within a two-level vertical channel consisting of a manufacturer selling through multiple 
independent retailers (Parry, 1995). Gérard P. Cachon and Martin A. Lariviere studied contracts that al-
low the supply chain to share demand forecasts credibly under either compliance regime (Cachon & 
Lariviere, 2001). It is obvious that utilizing timely and accurate information about demand and adjacent 
players is the best way to cope with the various uncertainties of the supply chain (Yao et al., 2008; 
Demirkan & Cheng, 2008;Chen et al., 2006). While the value of information sharing is widely recognized, 
we want to develop how information sharing affects supply chain performance, what types of information 
supply chain members should share, and how they should share it.  
2. Mathematical functions  
In the paper we consider the benefits of information sharing and ignore the technology cost involved. 
To provide energy sources   volume for customers, the SIP acquires a capacity C of energy sources sup-
plyplan from the SV who charges value V per unit of energy sources   outsourcing capacity. Then, the SIP 
sells the value-add integration energy sources   to customers at price P per unit of energy sources   request 
capacity. We can know the result of P>V in order to make a profit about the SIP. Because of a price-
sensitive customer energy sources   request at market, the SIP faces the actual energy sources   request 
volume w that is a random variable. w is characterized by the probability distribution F(w). Owing to the 
expected customer energy sources   request volume for the SIP energy sources   integration plan being 
affected by the price it changes P, the customer energy sources   volume is described by the following 
Equation. A different pricing will entail a different expected customer energy sources  request volume W. 
In our energy sources supply chain model, we assume that the price-sensitive customer energy sources   
request volume follows a uniform distribution over the range [ ( ) , ( ) ]w p w p−Δ + Δ across time periods for 
a profit. One might consider using a normal distribution to describe the price-sensitive random volume 
(Demirkan & Cheng, 2008). The normal distribution is not suitable in this context, as the uniform distri-
bution chosen for analytical tractability. According to above uniform distribution function F(w), the SIP 
expected profit which excluding marginal capacity costs can be defined by  
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 The equation describes the expected profit when actual customer energy sources   request volume is 
below or above the capacity C of energy sources supply plan from the SV. The fluctuating income for SV 
can be computed by the capacity C, multiplied by per unit of capacity, V. Moreover, the cost structure of 
SV has two components consisting of per unit cost of capacity described by the parameter m which re-
flects the constant economy of scale in energy sources (Mendelson, 1987); a diseconomy of scale cost 
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parameter n, related to the management of infrastructure results from increasing cost of managing capac-
ity and rising complexity of the business model (Cotton, 1975; Rubens, 2001). Hence, the SV’s profit 
function is defined as   2sv CV mC nCΨ = − − . Because of the random character of customer energy 
sources   request volume, costs associated with energy sources   ordering will raise more or less capacity 
of volume for the SIP and the SV. With regard to this, we assume more or less capacity cost of volume as 
follow,
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function ( )M w  represents the expected over-capacity cost of volume, and the function ( )L w  represents 
the expected under-capacity cost of volume. The parameter ξ  represents the salvage value of unused 
capacity and the parameter ζ  represents the opportunity cost of lost sales due to insufficient capacity 
depending on industry characteristic.  
3. Information sharing coordination scenario 
  Information revelation mechanism design is an important topic in economic management, in particu-
lar, in supply chain management (Xiao & Yang, 2009). In this paper, we consider two information shar-
ing coordination scenarios including: monocyclic information sharing coordination, SIP coordination 
information transferring scenario, SV coordination information distributing scenario, as shown below. 
In first scenario, the SV and the SIP negotiate to reach a mutually agreeable policy. With respect to the 
SV, the maximized profit function can achieve from the equation 2sv CV mC nCΨ = − − . When 0ddCΨ = ,
the optimal capacity C is defined as
2
V m
SV n
C −= . The capacity C of energy sources supply plan from the 
SV is optimal energy sources   volume to sell to the SIP. However, the SIP will find the optimal volume it 
wants to buy from the SV. Since the SIP bears the risk of the supply chain in monocyclic information 
sharing coordination, the more or less capacity costs of volume are included in the SIP’s profit function as 
follows: ( ) ( )SIP SIP M w L wΕ = Ψ − − .Instead, the SV derives the price-capacity schedule by finding the 
optimal energy sources   volume that maximizes its profit function described by 2V m nC= + . Then, 
given the per unit capacity price V, the SIP’s profit function requires that  
4 4 4
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given per unit capacity price V, let SIPC  be the optimal energy sources   volume for the SIP satisfying the 
above equation after some algebra. Then 2 ( ( ) ) ( )( ( ) )V w p P w pSIP PC
ξ ζ
ξ ζ
− Δ− −Δ + + +Δ
− += .  That is, it represents the 
optimal energy sources volume that the SIP wants to buy from the SV. With respect to capacity equilib-
rium of the whole supply chain, the energy sources   outsourcing volume the SIP want to buy will be the 
same as the volume the SV desires to sell. In other words, it should yield to feasible solution of V for both 
the SIP and the SV to reach an agreement, namely, SV SIPC C= . Because of 12 0SV
dC
dV n
= >  when n>0, 
SVC  is a strictly increasing function of V and 
2 0SIPdC
dV p ξ ζ
− Δ
− += <  when 0Δ > , SIPC  is a strictly decreas-
ing function of V. Thus there is a unique solution in monocyclic information sharing coordination. 
In another coordination strategy, there exists asymmetric information between the SIP and the SV. The 
price-sensitive random demand information and ordering decisions are closed to the SV. The SV coordi-
nates the energy sources supply chain and bears the risk of more or less capacity costs. Thus, the SIP 
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takes the purchase cost of per unit energy sources   volume capacity V as given and optimizes its expected 
profit as follows, 24 [ ( ( ) )] ( ) ( )
P V
SIP C w p P V w p
−
ΔΨ = − − + Δ − − .When the SIP does not bear the risk of 
more or less energy sources   volume capacity cost, it always orders the capacity up to the maximum limit 
of the customer’s request. The higher the SV charges the SIP per unit capacity V, the higher the price the 
SIP will charge the customers. Meanwhile, the energy sources   capacity the SIP will order from the SV, 
*C and the price the SIP which will charge to the customers *P will be communicated to the SV. Based 
on this information, the SV determines the optimal per unit capacity price *V  that maximizes its profit 
by considering more or less energy sources   capacity costs as follow, * *( ) ( *) ( *)SV C M w L wΨ = Ψ − − .
The objective function of the SV should be apparent that the SV only needs to be concerned with more 
energy sources   volume cost when the SIP orders the maximum possible energy sources   volume the 
customers would consume, which has incorporated the information disclosed from the SIP. However, 
when the SV coordinates the supply chain by taking the risk, the SIP will order the maximum limit of the 
customers energy sources   request volume, ( *)w p + Δ . When the SV is coordinating the supply chain, 
the optimal per unit price of capacity the SV should charge the SIP. The total supply chain profit is thus 
given by:  2 ** *
4
* [ * ( ( *) )] ( * *) ( *) ( ) ( *) ( *)P V C w p P V w p C M w L w−ΔΓ = − − + Δ − − +Ψ − −
4. Conclusions  
 In this research, the paper attempts to illustrate the benefits of energy sources supply chain partner-
ships with information sharing. The partnerships between the SV and the SIP are defined in terms of three 
information sharing levels. We analyses the energy sources supply chain’s performance under three dif-
ferent coordination strategies involving coordination and information sharing between the SV and the SIP. 
However, our research has some limitations. In reality, the SV sells energy sources volume to multiple 
SIP’s facing the same customers. The interaction between the SV and the SIP may be different when 
there are multiple SIP’s competing for the same customers, the price-sensitive customer energy sources 
request volume in our models follows a uniform distribution for analytical tractability reason. It is worth-
while to resolve these limitations for future research. 
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